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Abstract  
This article develops and tests a theory of party group lobbying which demonstrates how the 
European Parliament’s decision-making process shapes interest group interactions with 
legislators. Interest group behaviour is highly conditional on two motivations: (1) lobby 
powerful MEPs, and (2) lobby friendly MEPs. Friendliness is based on ideology, with power 
shaped by institutional rules and seat share. These goals can mutually reinforce each other. 
However, because these two motivations exist, and because political power is not fully 
predictable, there are strong incentives for interest groups to lobby party groups that are non-
natural allies to ensure that their policy information reaches the winning side. But, when 
interest groups engage in this behaviour, they retain their preference to lobby the friendliest 
members. The analysis is carried out on 9 policy-related categories of interest group, with 
MEP data from 3 parliaments (1999-2011) combined with information on the parliamentary 
role of 724 respondents.  
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Introduction 
A great deal is now known about the incentive structure through which interest groups 
decide which Members of the European Parliament (MEPs) to lobby (Kohler-Koch, 1998; 
Wessels, 1999; Bouwen, 2004; Eising, 2007; Mahoney, 2008; Marshall, 2010). Yet, scant 
attention has been given to assessing the role that European party group membership may 
play in this strategic choice, even though it is widely acknowledged that party groups are 
central to decision-making in the European Parliament (EP) (Attinà, 1990; Hix and Lord, 
1997; Raunio, 1997; Hix et al, 2006). The reason for this lack of interest may simply be that 
the explanation is considered self-evident. After all, it is more or less accepted that interest 
groups have a strong preference to lobby their friends (Baumgartner and Leech, 1996; 
Kollman, 1997; Hojnacki and Kimball, 1998), which in the EP translates to seeking advocacy 
from ideologically congruent political parties (Wessels, 1999). Indeed, these preferences 
underpin the main argument of the paper.  
However, in apparent contradiction, I suggest that interest groups frequently lobby 
MEPs belonging to the least congruent large party groups. This is because within the EP 
interest groups have a strong incentive to make certain that their policy position is registered 
with more than one of the ideologically distinct dominant party families: uncertainty about 
which parties will form a winning coalition on any given legislative issue means that failing 
to lobby unfriendly MEPs creates the risk that an interest group’s message will go unheard at 
the negotiating table.  
The extent to which organised interests deviate from the ‘lobbying friends’ strategy is 
a function of the EP institutional arrangements. It is the EP’s rules of procedure that position 
European party groups at the centre of the political web and in particular privilege the largest 
party families. With no permanent voting majority in any parliamentary term, decision-
making has so far always been contingent on the formation of several possible winning 
coalitions, each of which must contain at least two of the three largest political groups 
But, in addition to highlighting the limitation to the ‘lobbying your friends’ thesis an 
explanation is provided for its resilience. It is anticipated that when the strategic decision is 
taken to lobby members of a relatively unfriendly party group, interest groups’ revert to the 
practice of discriminating on the basis of policy preferences, but in this instance within the 
population of least aligned large party group members. As such, they choose to lobby the 
most sympathetic members from amongst this otherwise off-limits party. 
 In principle these theoretical expectations are compatible with much of what we 
already know about the relative influence of MEPs and lobbying in the EP. As such, and in 
order to facilitate a unified understanding, certain key findings from the literature will be 
analysed alongside the central argument. These include the assumption that interest groups 
overwhelmingly lobby MEPs that are members of a germane committee (Bowen, 2004). This 
is important to establish because such behaviour would be entirely consistent with the policy-
seeking motivation that the theory ascribes to interest groups, and as such would necessarily 
extend the theoretical reach to within the committee system. These ideas are also consistent 
with the underlying assumption that disparities in legislative influence between MEPs 
provide a strong incentive for interest groups to modify their strategic behaviour. Therefore it 
seems appropriate to incorporate into the analysis the insight that legislative influence is also 
positively correlated with individuals’ level of engagement with the legislative process 
(Kreppel, 2002; Yoshinaka et al, 2010).    
These ideas are examined through several sources of information, including responses 
by MEPs to surveys carried out by the European Parliamentary Research Group (EPRG) 
during the 5
th
, 6
th
 and 7
th
 parliaments (Farrell et al, 2011); parliamentary data on the activities 
of the 724 MEPs that responded to the surveys; and responses received from interest groups. 
The starting point for the analysis was selected to coincide with the point that the EP can 
unambiguously be described as a co-legislature alongside the Council, following the reform 
and extension of the co-decision procedure (Crombez, 2001).  
The following section of the paper synthesises key insights about the role of European 
party groups, national parties, the EP’s committee system, and the literature explaining the 
pattern and causal mechanism of organised interests’ interactions with MEPs. Together this 
investigation underpins the theoretical expectations and testable hypotheses presented in the 
second section. The methodological approach is set out in the third, including a clear 
explanation of the variables later used. Thereafter, the results are presented followed by a 
concluding assessment of the significance of party membership on lobbying behaviour.  
Literature 
European party groups play a vital role in structuring political debate and coalition 
formation within the EP (Hix and Lord, 1997; Kreppel, 2002); with the rules of procedure 
facilitating this outcome. What is more, although national party loyalties are likely to take 
precedence when in conflict with the party group (Ringe, 2010), these occasions are now far 
from the norm (Hix and Noury, 2009). This increased tendency for party groups to vote en 
bloc appears to be a consequence of the growth in the EP’s institutional power rather than as 
a function of ideological congruence (Raunio, 1997; Hix et al, 2007). Each new treaty since 
the implementation of the Single European Act (1987) has given the EP more power, which 
has led party groups to increase the incentives for their members to adhere to the party whip.  
The inclusion of at least two of the three largest political groups, i.e. the European 
Peoples Party (EPP), the Party of European Socialists (PES),
1
 or the Alliance of Liberals and 
Democrats for Europe (ALDE), is essential for a winning coalition to form. This is because to 
                                            
1 In the 7th parliament the Party of European Socialists became the Progressive Alliance of Socialists and Democrats. For 
simplicity the PES/S&D group will be referred to as simply the PES.   
date no party has secured a majority of seats, and with no government to support there is no 
necessity for permanent coalitions to be formed. Although in the past there was a tendency 
for ‘grand coalitions’ to form between the PES and the EPP, these have become less common 
since the early 1990s, and by the 6
th
 parliament the two largest parties voted independently 
with the liberals more often than they did with each other (Hix and Høyland, 2011). This 
trend was aided by the rapid increase in first reading co-decision agreements, made possible 
under the Treaty of Amsterdam (1999), which do away with the necessity to form oversize 
majorities. 
The effect has been to facilitate de facto legislative agreements between EP 
committees and the Council prior to the first reading in plenary, thereby privileging 
committees (Farrell and Héritier, 2003; Häge and Kaeding, 2007) and in particular the 
rapporteurs (Héritier, 2007; Costello and Thompson, 2010). As such, the EP’s inter-
institutional negotiating position invariably reflects the policy agreed within committee, 
which is reached through a simple majority of attending members. This delegation of power 
by the plenary to its legislative committees is only possible because EP committees conform 
to the formal requirement that they ‘reflect the composition of Parliament’ (Rule 177; 2010), 
which includes party group membership (McElroy, 2006; Yordanova, 2009).  
The institutional framework is constructed in such a way that for a committee member 
to exert particular legislative influence, sustained engagement with the policy process is 
required (Marshall, 2010). This relationship is reflected in the allocation of Committee 
reports, where MEPs’ relative level of voting activity in plenary is one of several explanatory 
factors (Kreppel, 2002; Yoshinaka et al, 2010). It follows that MEPs are more likely to join a 
committee that covers a policy area with salience to those special interests that they are 
already associated with (Yordanova, 2009), which makes the finding that committee 
membership makes no significant difference to the likelihood of an MEP being lobbied by 
business interests somewhat puzzling (Eising, 2007). 
The literature makes it clear that party groups are integral to decision-making in the 
EP, which is concentrated within the committee structure. Yet research on interest group 
behaviour has largely overlooked the role of party groups. The exception is Wessels (1999) 
who addressed the issue through a series of two-dimensional plots showing the density of 
interactions between MEPs and interest groups during the pre-Amsterdam era 4
th
 parliament 
(1994-1999). He identified three broad alignments between interest groups and party groups: 
(1) business interests with Liberal, Christian Democrat, and Conservative party groups; (2) 
trade unions with Communists and Socialist party groups; and (3) environmental and 
consumer interests with Green and radical party groups.  
Attention has been given to the question of whether it is strategically advantageous 
for interest groups to lobby legislators who are known to be unsympathetic to their cause. The 
approach taken is rooted in the Congressional literature, where this once live debate appears 
settled: organised interests hardly ever lobby their opponents, and only occasionally interact 
with those yet to decide (Baumgartner and Leech, 1996; Kollman, 1997; Hojnacki and 
Kimball, 1998). The underlying logic for this behaviour is provided by the signalling 
literature, which emphasises the importance of a lobbyist’s reputation for providing good 
quality policy information as a means of overcoming information asymmetries (Parker, 
2004). The implication is that reputations are built over time and are more likely to be 
fostered with likeminded policy-makers. A contrasting perspective is offered by Hall and 
Waymen (1990), albeit in respect to campaign contributions, in which they show that within 
congressional committees organised interests commit resources to both mobilise natural 
supporters and to discourage opposing legislators from mobilising – with the aim of altering 
patterns of participation rather than the remote prospect of directly securing votes.   
In the EP, through formal modelling of interest group behaviour, the applicability of 
the lobbying your friends’ thesis has been demonstrated, at least in respect to the plenary 
(Crombez, 2002); a contribution that remains consistent with Wessel’s earlier empirical 
work. But where the EP literature departs from this perspective it is in respect to the period 
when the rappporteur drafts her legislative report. Here the institutional constraints are such 
that considerable agenda setting power is concentrated in the hands of a single possibly 
friendly legislator. In these circumstances the allure of power trumps that of friendship, with 
interest groups electing to lobby rapporteurs irrespective of whether they are from a party 
group that supports opposing policies to their own (Marshall, 2010).  
The corresponding literature encompassing interest group interactions with national 
parties is surprisingly limited, particularly in respect to unstructured contacts which 
increasingly dominate relations (Rasmussen and Lindeboom, 2013).  Instead the focus has 
tended towards in-depth studies analysing ties between parties and closely associated 
interests (for example, Quinn, 2010 and Thomas, 2001), in effect drawing upon those 
relationships first identified by Duverger (1954) as instrumental in creating and sustaining 
political parties.  
 In contrast Allern’s (2010) in-depth study of the Norwegian case illustrates 
that parties have links with a diverse set of societal actors rather than a chosen few. This 
finding corresponds to the observation that through the process of cartelisation the established 
relationships between political parties and civil society organisations have diminished (Katz 
and Mair, 1995), and arguably better approximate to the informal and fluid pattern of 
lobbying that occurs within the EP (Bowen, 2004). However, Allern’s focus on central party 
structures does not capture the general shift in lobbying attention towards parliamentary 
groups, and as such maybe less relevant to the case of the EP. More recent research by Otjes 
and Rasmussen (2013) provide such parliamentary group focus. Analysing interest group ties 
in Denmark and the Netherlands they reveal the persistence of the left/right division, with 
groups associated with the left preferring to interact with likeminded parties and vice versa. 
Interesting, they find that this relationship is weaker in Denmark where governments tend to 
alternate between left and right.  
This brief review has highlighted the increasingly decisive role that both large party 
groups and the committee system play in defining the EP’s legislative position. Committee 
power, which is delegated from the plenary, is contingent on the support of a winning 
coalition that must include two or more of the largest party groups. Interest groups lobby 
members of sympathetic party groups within the EP, much as they do within national party 
systems. Where interest groups refrain from lobbying members of congruent political parties, 
the literature suggests that this maybe because there is an absence of friendly influential 
legislators.   
Explaining interest group interactions with MEPs 
Interest groups seek to influence policy outcomes. Therefore it is expected that groups 
will adapt their strategic behaviour to take account of the specific nature of the decision-
making process, which includes the structure of wining coalition formation as well as other 
hallmarks of legislative influence. But, in the knowledge that if all things are equal it is most 
advantageous to lobby legislators with closely aligned interests. To maximise the explanatory 
power and robustly assess the theory of party group lobbying, the analysis is conducted 
alongside existing ideas that link legislative influence with interest groups’ strategic 
behaviour.  
Coalition formation and the effect on party group lobbying 
Given the central role played by political groups in EP decision-making, it would be 
surprising if interest groups’ lobbying decisions were party-blind. As such, the three 
dominant party groups’ hold on decision-making will constrain the range of viable parties 
interest groups can choose to lobby. For example, interest groups which in other 
circumstances may not be drawn to these pro-integration centrist parties have a strategic 
incentive to redirect at least part of their lobbying effort to parties at the centre of coalition 
formation. Therefore, it is expected that: 
H1. MEPs from the three dominant party groups are lobbied more often than members 
from other party families.  
However, the fluid nature of winning coalition formation has an additional effect on 
interest groups’ strategic behaviour. They intentionally engage in lobbying MEPs from the 
least friendly of the dominant political groups. The reason for this surprising yet theoretically 
consistent behaviour is that unlike most national parliaments, where voting coalitions are 
broadly stable and therefore known in advance, in the EP it is uncertain which party groups 
will be on the winning side. This creates a powerful incentive for interest groups to ‘hedge 
their bets’ and divert considerable lobbying effort away from the party group that they are 
naturally more associated with, to a party that is a non-natural ally. Therefore, in contrast to 
the expectation found in the literature we should observe that:  
H2. The frequency of MEP interactions with groups representing either civil society   
or producer interests will be similar for members of both the EPP and PES. 
However, rather than falsifying the ‘lobbying your friends’ thesis, these expectations 
simply represent a further and more significant limitation to interest groups’ unconstrained 
lobbying preference, i.e. in addition to lobbying unfriendly rapporteurs. This is because 
interest groups underlying motivation, even when constrained, continues to structure their 
choice of lobbying target. Therefore, when for strategic reasons interest groups lobby a party 
group that is not a natural ally, they revert to their unconstrained default position and lobby 
those closest to their own policy preferences, but in this case within the population of non-
friendly party members. Therefore, the expectation is that:    
H3. When interest groups attempt to influence dominant party groups that are 
naturally less supportive, they lobby those members with relatively close policy 
preferences. 
Towards a unified understanding: participation and committee membership  
It seems plausible to expect that interest groups’ interactions with MEPs are 
conditional upon the latter’s membership of a policy relevant committee, particularly given 
that the EP’s policy output has become increasingly defined through the scrutiny carried out 
by its standing committees (Corbett et al 2011).  But if committee membership turned out to 
be unimportant to lobbyists (Eising, 2007), it would suggest that they are not policy-seekers, 
thereby falsifying a key assumption of the theory as presented. In contrast, empirical support 
for the relationship would suggest that what holds for the theory of party group lobbying will 
hold within the EP’s committees, which would maximise the explanatory power of the 
theory. As such, we should observe that: 
H4. Interest groups are more likely to lobby MEPs that are members of a policy 
relevant committee than non-members. 
But, although committee membership may provide the opportunity to be influential, 
this is not to say that committee members are equally influential, and hence of equivalent 
interest to lobbyists. However, given that relative levels of participation in the legislative 
process are an important factor in determining policy influence (Kreppel, 2002; and 
Yoshinaka et al, 2010), and the theoretical assumptions presented thus far are predicated on 
interest groups’ desire to lobby influential legislators, it should be the case that: 
H5. Interest groups are more likely to lobby MEPs that are active legislators. 
The Data 
To assess the inherently unobservable phenomenon of lobbying behaviour, the analysis draws 
on several sources of MEP data covering three European Parliaments (1999-2004; 2004-
2009; and 2009-14).  The sample under analysis is defined by responses to three surveys of 
MEPs (2000, 2006, and 2010) conducted by the EPRG (Farrell et al, 2011). The number of 
individual observations is 724 (35%), out of a possible 2,094 MEPs that were in office at the 
time the respective surveys were conducted. The sample of MEPs for each survey is 
comparable, and reasonably representative of the EP as a whole in terms of party group 
membership and nationality (Hix et al, 2011). The survey results provide self-reported 
information on MEPs’ contacts with specific categories of interest group, on their policy 
opinions and on their ideological position. Information on MEPs’ seniority and committee 
membership was obtained from Høyland et al’s (2009) MEP database, with further data 
collected via the EP’s website. In addition the analysis draws from 80 responses to a question 
asked by the author to 86 interest groups that are active in the EP.       
The dependent variables are the number of contacts that MEPs report to have had with 
nine policy specific categories of interest group. There are six possible responses to this 
question which are initially coded in the manner adopted by Wessels (1999). Responses of ‘at 
least once a week’ are taken as 52 on an annualised basis; ‘at least once a month’ as 12; ‘at 
least every three months’ as 4; ‘at least once a year’ as 1; with both ‘less often’ and ‘no 
contact’ represented as 0.2 The questionnaires asked respondents to give answers for both 
national and European group variants for 8 of the 9 categories. But as this distinction is 
outside the scope of the paper the results for these variants have been combined, allowing a 
                                            
2 This transformation enables the relative differences in contacts to be more fully captured . However, analysis conducted 
with the dependent variables left untransformed i.e. ranging 0-5 (ordered logit), yielded broadly similar results.  
more nuanced picture of MEPs interaction across policy sectors to emerge.
3
 The independent 
variables are as follows: 
Party dummies: One each for the four largest European party groups, i.e. EPP, PES, ALDE 
and the Green party.   
Left/Right self-placement: This measures an MEP’s perception of his or her ideological 
position on a 10-point left/right spectrum; extreme left = 1, and extreme right = 10.
4
   
Policy opinion(s): MEPs’ responses to policy questions that have a good fit to five of the nine 
dependent variable categories are reported. There are two distinct question formats, with the 
first asking MEPs if they ‘think there should be more or less EU regulation in the following 
[two] areas’: ‘environmental protection standards’; and ‘discrimination’. The second question 
type asked MEPs if they ‘think there should be more or less of the EU budget spent on the 
following [three] areas’: ‘agricultural price support’; ‘scientific research and development’; 
and ‘support for refugees’. The questions allowed for five possible responses, coded 1-5; with 
preferences for ‘a lot more’ of a given policy, coded as 1; ‘a little more’ as 2; ‘about the 
same’ as 3; ‘a little less’ as 4; and ‘a lot less’ as 5.  
Committee membership dummies: MEPs’ membership of a committee is matched to a 
corresponding dependent variable (interest group type). But, with committee responsibilities 
sometimes shifting between parliaments, it has been necessary to track these changes. This 
means that committee descriptions refer to the enduring policy sector. For example, consumer 
interests were combined with Environmental policy in the 5
th
 parliament, but became part of 
IMCO in the 6
th
 and 7
th
 parliaments. Here the discussion and analysis refers to the committee 
with responsibility for consumer interests. This means that the categories are not exclusive, 
with committees generally encompassing additional policy areas. However, the direction of 
                                            
3 This means that there are 13 possible values that these variables can take: 0, 1, 4, 5, 12, 13, 16, 24, 52, 56, 64, and 104. 
4 MEP responses for the 7th Parliament are rescaled because in this instance the question adopted an 11 point scale (1-11).    
any misalignment is such that the results presented are likely to understate the anticipated 
effect. The status of committee substitutes proved more problematic. This is because many of 
them are amongst the more prominent committee members,
5
 yet it appears that more 
commonly substitutes play a less meaningful part in committee life. To reconcile this, 
committee substitutes are taken to be de facto members if they have written a legislative 
report, thereby demonstrating a high level of engagement with the committee. 
Participation: measures MEPs attendance at plenary (roll-call) voting sessions, for the 
appropriate parliament; it is coded between 0 and 1, with 1 indicating 100% attendance. The 
sample mean is 0.8 (80%), whereas the population mean is 0.73 (73%).
6
  
Rapporteur: measures the number of reports written within a relevant committee in a given 
parliament for either the Co-decision or consultation procedures.
7
 
Parliament Dummies: for the 6
th
 and 7
th
 parliaments. 
Member State Dummies: for the four largest member states. 
Specification 
Each of the nine interest-specific dependent variables is first tested in one general model 
specification. Because the dependent variable is effectively a count of the number of times an 
MEP has been lobbied, the equation is fitted following a Poisson distribution of the form: 
ln(𝑦𝑖?̂?) = 𝛼𝑗 + 𝛽1𝑗 ∗ 𝑐𝑜𝑚𝑚𝑖𝑡𝑡𝑒𝑒𝑖𝑗 + 𝛽2𝑗 ∗ 𝑟𝑎𝑝𝑝𝑜𝑟𝑡𝑒𝑢𝑟𝑖𝑗 +             
                               𝛽3𝑗 ∗ 𝑝𝑎𝑟𝑡𝑖𝑐𝑖𝑝𝑎𝑡𝑖𝑜𝑛𝑖𝑗 + 𝛽4𝑗 ∗ 𝑙𝑒𝑓𝑡/𝑟𝑖𝑔ℎ𝑡𝑖𝑗 + 𝛽5𝑗 ∗ 𝑒𝑝𝑝𝑖𝑗 +               (1) 
                                            
5 Yoshinaka et al (2010) note that for the 4th and 5th parliaments, 15% and 14% of all reports were assigned to committee 
substitutes. 
6 This may suggests that MEPs who turn-up less often to vote are also less likely to reply to surveys, which has implications 
for survey data in general. 
7 The Consultation procedure was included following Kardasheva’s (2009) insight that the EP often exerts significant 
influence. 
                         𝛽6𝑗 ∗ 𝑝𝑒𝑠𝑖𝑗 + 𝛽7𝑗 ∗ 𝑎𝑙𝑑𝑒 + 𝛽8𝑗 ∗ 𝑔𝑟𝑒𝑒𝑛 + 𝛽9𝑗 ∗  𝑜𝑝𝑖𝑛𝑖𝑗 +                              
                              𝛽10𝑗 ∗ 6𝑡ℎ 𝑝𝑎𝑟𝑙 𝑖𝑗 + 𝛽11𝑗 ∗ 7𝑡ℎ 𝑝𝑎𝑟𝑙𝑖𝑗 + 𝛽12𝑗 ∗ 𝑔𝑒𝑟𝑚𝑦 + 
𝛽13𝑗 ∗ 𝑖𝑡𝑙𝑦 𝑖𝑗 + 𝛽14𝑗 ∗ 𝑓𝑟𝑖𝑗 + 𝛽15𝑗 ∗ 𝑢𝑘𝑖𝑗 + 𝜀𝑖𝑗 
For ∀ 𝑗 = 1, … ,9 
Where:                   Pr(𝑦𝑖𝑗|𝑥𝑖𝑗, 𝛿𝑖𝑗) =
𝑒− ln(𝑦𝑖?̂?)ln (𝑦𝑖?̂?)
𝑦𝑖𝑗
𝑦𝑖𝑗!
           For ∀ 𝑗 = 1, … ,9         
Testing for over-dispersion in each of the models (Ho: 𝛿 = 1), the results suggest that 
the model under-fits the amount of dispersion in lobbying for all categories. Therefore it is 
appropriate to adopt the negative binomial model specification. However, several categories 
contained a significant number of zero counts. This necessitated the use of a zero inflated 
negative binomial specification, where the count outcome is weighted by the probability of 
that count being zero.
8
 The first model specification measures responses for each of the nine 
interest categories.  
The second and third model specifications include all explanatory variables except for 
party groups, but are constrained respectively by membership of the EPP (2
nd
 model) and 
PES (3
rd
 model). This enables the effect of interest group lobbying of non-natural allies (and 
allies) to be assessed given that of the three dominant party groups, the EPP and PES occupy 
the most clearly contrasting positions on the dominant left/right political dimension. This 
distinction is replicated amongst the population of interest groups through the simplifying 
assumption that the five producer interests (agriculture, industry, transport, trade, and 
banking & insurance) are likely to be allied more closely to the EPP, and are therefore non-
natural allies of the PES. This logic is then applied to the four civil societal interests 
(environment, human rights, gender, and consumer interests), with the expectation that their 
interests are more closely aligned with the PES. 
                                            
8 To ascertain the appropriate model, a Vuong test was used to compare the zero inflated negative binomial with the negative 
binomial baseline specification (see Long and Freese 2006 and Greene 1994). 
Results 
This section assesses the extent to which the theoretical ideas stand up to scrutiny. The first 
step is to consider the hypotheses that explicitly relate to party groups. This is followed by an 
evaluation of the contextual expectations, which define the scope and relevance of the theory. 
Party group lobbying   
The initial hypothesis, that MEPs from the three dominant party groups are lobbied more 
often than members from other party families (H1), is assessed through the first model 
specification (Table 1). Looking first at the EPP variable (all significant at 0.1 level), the 
results indicate that party members are more likely to be lobbied than non-members by 
between 33.2% (agriculture & fisheries groups) and 121.7% (trade & commerce 
associations), when holding all other variables constant.
9
 A similar pattern is reported for the 
PES, with significant results found for eight of the nine categories of interest groups. The 
expected increase in reported lobbying contacts ranges from 40% (consumer groups) to 90% 
(transport groups). This effect is also closely replicated for the liberals (ALDE). Again 
significant results are found for eight of the nine categories of interest groups, indicating an 
increase in lobbying of party members ranging from 30.6% (consumer groups) to 214.2% 
(human rights groups). 
These results lend considerable support to the theory, but what had not been 
anticipated is the strong focal point provided by the Green Party for environmental, consumer 
and agriculture/fisheries lobbyists. Interestingly, these results suggest that in the policy areas 
where the Green Party receives significant lobbying attention, the PES appears to be 
somewhat less favoured compared to other policy areas. This may be indicative of a 
                                            
9 The percentage figures, as reported in models 1, 2 and 3, are derived from exponentialβ. Hence for agriculture and fishing a 
factor change of 1.332 = 33.2 percentage points, holding all other variables constant.    
reallocation of the portion of lobbying attention that is directed to ‘friendly’ left of centre 
parties. 
 
                                ---   Table 1 about here   --- 
 
 
To test the hypothesis that the frequency of MEP interactions with groups 
representing either civil society or producer interests will be similar for members of both the 
EPP and PES (H2), the predicted counts (contacts) for the two party groups are assessed 
across all 9 categories of interest groups. The results are shown in Table 2; with committee 
membership, participation and parliament set to their mean value; rapporteurship to 0, 
left/right self-placement to 5, and country values set to Germany.
10
 The initial impression is 
that the relative party values for each category of interest group are broadly comparable, 
which is line with the expectation. More specifically, when comparing each pair of predicted 
counts we find that all confidence intervals overlap at the 95% level, enabling the null 
hypothesis to be rejected. It is also interesting to note that in 3 of the 4 instances (out of 18) 
where the predicted counts fall outside the opposing confidence interval we observe higher 
levels of unfriendly lobbying than friendly. Indeed the results give the impression of a fluid 
lobbying environment with PES lobbying likely to be higher than for the EPP in 2 of the 4 
categories of producer interest, with the converse true for 3 of the 4 categories of civil 
society.  
                                            ---   Table 2 about here   --- 
 
 
                                            
10 There is no substantive difference to the predicted count result when the model is run without controls. 
 
An alternative perspective is provided through interviews with 80 interest groups 
representing both civil society and producer interests. Interviewees were asked to consider 
the number of policy related contacts that they have had with the three largest party groups, 
and then allocate a percentage to each. The results, in respect to the EPP and PES, are 
presented in Table 3. Although less convincing than those for the much larger sample of MEP 
reported contacts they nevertheless suggests that lobbying of unfriendly party groups is only 
20% less common than lobbying of friendly groups, which is a long way from Baumgartner 
and Leech’s (2002) assertion that this activity hardly ever happens. 
 
                                            ---   Table 3 about here   --- 
 
 
It is also interesting to note, with reference to Model 1 (Table 1), that for each party 
group, the average increase in lobbying contacts for both producer and civil society interests 
turns out to be broadly comparable i.e. for the EPP: 70.3% / 78.4%; and for the PES: 53.3% / 
55.7%. This indicates that the decision to lobby large party groups may be less constrained by 
ideology than the decision of which individual party member to lobby. This is illustrated in 
Figure 1, which shows the predicted counts for two categories of interests (business and civil 
society). Through the left/right self-placement scores (x-axis), the intensity of 
banking/insurance lobbying is shown to increase as MEPs move away from the left side of 
the ideological spectrum. The mirror-image of this effect can be observed for consumer 
groups.
11
 Interestingly, although the theory provides no expectation for lobbying within 
supportive party groups the same ideological bias is observable. 
                                            
11 These results also make it clear that the observable behaviour is not driven by a central lobbying tendency. 
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This provides some confidence to assess the final party group hypothesis that when 
interest groups attempt to influence dominant party groups that are naturally less supportive, 
they lobby those members with relatively close policy preferences (H3). This expectation is 
assessed with the aid of models 2 & 3 (Table 4). Here the results for each independent 
variable (interest category) relate only to members of the corresponding naturally less 
supportive party group. Hence the lobbying activities of civil society interests (4 categories) 
are reported for members of the EPP (model 2), whereas the lobbying activities of producer 
interests (5 categories) are reported for members of the PES (model 3). Two approaches are 
taken to assess this hypothesis. 
 
                                            ---   Table 4 about here   --- 
 
 
Initially the effect of ideology within party group is assessed by means of the variable 
measuring MEPs’ left/right self-placement score. The results for all nine committees are 
significant and in the anticipated party contingent direction. As such, holding all other 
variables constant, a 1 place move to the right in an EPP member’s left/right self-placement 
score (range 1-10) is associated with a decrease in lobbying by civil societal interest of 
between 19.3% (consumer groups) and 33.9% (human rights groups). In line with 
expectations, the inverse effect is observable for the relationship between PES members and 
producer interest. Here the percentage change in producer interest lobbying associated with a 
1 point move to the right, ranges from 18.1% (agriculture & fisheries groups) to 67.5% 
(banking & insurance groups). The predicted counts for two categories of non-naturally allied 
interest are graphed in Figure 2. 
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The high level of support found for hypothesis H3 on the party contingent left/right 
ideological dimension is also found to hold for an alternative measure: policy opinion(s). In 
all, five policy opinion variables are matched to five of the 9 interest group contact variables 
and are again tested through models 2 & 3 (Table 4). Here EPP members’ opinions on civil 
societal issues are assessed (environmental, discrimination and refugee), along with PES 
members positions with respect to producer interests (agriculture and research & 
development). The results for all five party contingent policy opinion variables were found to 
be significant and in the anticipated direction. That is to say, as the self-defined policy score 
of members of a relatively unfriendly large party group increases, i.e. their desire for more of 
the related policy decreases; they are less likely to be lobbied by associated interests. For 
example, the likely effect of an EPP member’s one unit decrease in support for environmental 
protection standards (1-5 scale) is to decrease environmental groups’ lobbying by 27.5%, 
holding all other variables constant. An effect of similar magnitude is observable for a PES 
member’s position on agricultural support with respect to lobbying by agricultural (and 
fishing) interests.   
Committee membership and participation 
Given that the EP’s legislative committees have progressively increased their hold on 
policy making during the post-Amsterdam period of this analysis, it is vital to understand 
whether interest group behaviour reflects this shift in political power. If it can be shown that 
Interest groups are more likely to lobby MEPs that are members of a policy relevant 
committee than non-members (H4), and this finding holds within the analysis (models) 
presented thus far, then the theory of party group lobbying will be equally applicable within 
the EP’s strong committee system.  
Preliminary evidence for this expectation is offered in Figure 2 (above), which 
distinguishes between committee members and other MEPs, but a full assessment is made 
with reference to the committee membership dummy variable reported in model 1 (Table 1). 
Here the coefficients for all 9 committees are in the expected direction, and significant at the 
.01 level. This can be interpreted as, for example, the effect of committee membership in the 
committee with responsibility for consumer policy is to increase the expected number of 
consumer group lobbying contacts by 176.2 (%), holding all other variables constant. These 
encouraging findings also hold for interest group lobbying of large party groups that are non-
natural allies, as shown in models 2 & 3 (Table 4) with reference to the same committee 
membership variable. 
The final expectation is that Interest groups are more likely to lobby MEPs that are 
active legislators (H5). Support for this hypothesis would further imbed the theory within the 
wider legislative literature, whilst providing a further insight in to how lobbyists differentiate 
between legislators, whereas a null result would challenge a key theoretical assumption that 
lobbyists are instrumental in their policy-seeking actions. 
To make an evaluation the initial step is to assess the variable participation through 
the first model (Table 1). Here support for the hypotheses is found from seven of the nine 
interest groupings at the .1 level of significance or above. For a 1% increase in a MEPs 
attendance at roll-call votes, their likelihood of being lobbied increases by between 0.5% and 
2.4%. This level of increase is substantial when put in the context of the 12% to 100% range 
in MEP’s level of attendance (mean = 80.2). Moreover, this finding also holds for the 
majority of interest categories when lobbying non-natural allies (models 2 & 3).  
An alternative ‘within committee’ assessment is made through the explanatory 
variable rapporteur, which captures the most clearly identifiable act of participation. The 
results presented in model 1 (Table 1) show that seven of the nine committees are significant 
at the .1 level and in the direction anticipated, offering further support to the hypothesis. 
Holding all other variables constant the effect of each report that a committee member writes 
is to increase the expected number of lobbying contacts by a policy relevant interest group by 
between 13.1% (environmental groups) and 100.6% (women’s organisations). However, the 
results for lobbying a rapporteur that is a non-natural ally (models 2 & 3) are less convincing. 
Although, eight of the nine categories are in the anticipated direction, just four are at a 
sufficient level of significance (0.1 or above). The predicted counts for H4 and H5 are 
projected in Figure 3, for two categories of interest group lobbying.  
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Discussion 
This article establishes that interest groups that are active in the EP are policy-seekers 
with a highly nuanced grasp on the decision-making process. As a consequence, they identify 
that membership of any given party group or legislative committee will contribute to the 
differences in legislative influence between MEPs, and that within these memberships the 
distribution of influence is unevenly distributed. In addition, interest groups are able to assess 
MEPs’ relative responsiveness to their policy position, as well as recognise and respond to 
the fluidity of voting coalitions. This knowledge amounts to a formidable array of strategic 
considerations. 
 Fundamental to the explanation is the atypical nature of vote-winning coalitions in the 
EP, which can and frequently do exclude one of the two largest party families. This situation 
occurs as a consequence of an institutional design that has at its heart a parliament with no 
government to support, and in which to date no party has achieved an overall majority of 
seats. As a result, it is difficult for lobbyists to predict which leading party family will be on 
the winning side of any given vote. This matters because if an interest group receives even 
very limited support from a winning coalition it may well be an improvement on receiving 
strong support from a party group that is excluded from the negotiating table. As such, in the 
absence of a voting equilibrium, interest groups choose to ‘hedge their bets’.   
This explanation has benefitted from an analytical approach that synthesises 
theoretical expectations with some of what we already know about the relative influence of 
MEPs. The analysis adds traction to Hall and Waymen’s (1990) somewhat out of favour 
finding that in addition to organised interests expending resources persuading influential 
legislators within a friendly party to mobilise, there is a compelling reason to also persuade 
influential members of unfriendly party to desist from mobilising even if this latter activity is 
less effective. This is because the likelihood of persuading an influential member of an 
unfriendly party to refrain from actively participating is surely higher if they are at least 
relatively friendly. 
Finally, the findings presented may well have implications for interest group 
behaviour in national parliaments, although here a different pattern of lobbying is anticipated. 
The key distinction is that in the national setting winning coalitions are generally stable 
owing to the presence of a permanent governing majority. Therefore, it should follow that 
interest groups for whom at least one governing party is an ally will have little or no incentive 
to lobby opposition parties. In contrast those interest groups that are aligned with a party in 
opposition will have a strong incentive to build relationships with governing parties. 
Therefore in the national context an asymmetric version of that shown for the EP is 
anticipated, one that flips in line with clear changes in government and opposition. 
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Figure 1 Predicted lobbying counts across party membership  
 
Note: predicted count is for a corresponding committee member, non-rapporteur, with country values set to Germany and all 
other values held at their mean 
 
 
Figure 2 Predicted effects for lobbying unnatural allies and policy preferences
 
Note: Based respectively on models 1 & 2; country values set to Germany; rapporteur at zero; all others held at their means. 
 
Figure 3 Predicted lobbying counts for rapporteurs, relevant committee membership, across 
participation in the plenary 
         
Note: The values for rapporteur are set to their median, EPP as party group, with Germany as large country. All other values 
are set to their mean. Derived from model 1.   
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 Table 1  Model 1: Explaining Interest Group Contacts with MEPs 
Independent Variables Environ  
Groups  
Human  
rights  
Groups  
Women's  
Organis-  
ations 
Consumer  
Groups 
Agriculture  
Fisheries  
Groups 
Banking &  
Insurance  
Groups 
Industrial  
Organis-  
ations 
Trade &  
Commerce  
Associations 
Transport  
Groups  
                Civil Societal Interests                              Producer Interests 
Specification 
NBREG NBREG NBREG NBREG 
Zero Inflated  
NBREG  NBREG 
Zero Inflated  
NBREG NBREG NBREG 
EPP 0.48*** 0.71*** 0.49** 0.62*** 0.29* 0.49** 0.43** 0.80*** 0.59*** 
61.2% 102.8% 63.6% 86% 33.2% 62.8% 54.4% 121.7% 80.5% 
(0.147) (0.19) (0.204) (0.142) (0.164) (0.180) (0.153) (0.160) (0.183) 
PES 0.17 0.35* 0.62** 0.34** 0.49** 0.60** 0.37** 0.57*** 0.65*** 
18% 42.2% 85.1% 40% 62.5% 81.8% 45.3% 76.1% 90.6% 
(0.151) (0.194) (0.222) (0.150) (0.178) (0.189) (0.156) (0.168) (0.189) 
ALDE 0.41** 1.15*** 0.45* 0.27* 0.44** 0.57** 0.39** 0.55** 0.31 
51% 214.2% 56.1% 30.6% 54.7% 77.2% 47.4% 73.2% 36.4% 
(0.165) (0.220) (0.232) (0.160) (0.190) (0.203) (0.166) (0.180) (0.205) 
Greens 0.81*** 0.54 0.30 0.59** 0.59** 0.00 -0.01 -0.21 0.28 
123.7% 72.3% 35.5% 80.5% 79.8% 0% -1.2% 18.5% 31.9% 
(0.215) (0.314) (0.298) (0.209) (0.277) (0.277) (0.248) (0.25) (0.275) 
Left/Right Self-Placement -0.11 -0.25*** -0.08* -0.07** 0.03 0.11** 0.60* 0.7** 0.07* 
-10.1% -22% -7.5% -6.8 3% 11.3% 6.1% 7% 7.7% 
(0.032) (0.038) (0.048) (0.310) (0.035) (0.04) (0.032) (0.034) (0.041) 
Policy Opinion -0.26*** -0.16** -0.35***    n/a -0.34*    n/a -0.26***    n/a    n/a 
-13% -14.4% -29.2%    n/a -28.8%    n/a -23.3%    n/a    n/a 
(0.053) (0.057) (0.066)    n/a (0.052)    n/a (0.051)    n/a    n/a 
Committee membership 1.24*** 1.29*** 1.98*** 1.02*** 1.49*** 1.29*** 0.97*** 1.50*** 1.42*** 
246% 262.4% 623.7% 176.2% 344.2% 263% 164.4% 347.8% 314.3% 
 (0.123) (0.161) (0.264) (0.178) (0.153) (0.279) (0.133) (0.214) (0.227) 
Participation  0.02*** 0.01** 0.00 0.01** 0.01** 0.02*** 0.01* 0.01 0.01** 
1.5% 0.9% 0.3% 0.7% 0.9% 2.4% 0.5% 0.6% 1.1% 
(0.002) (0.004) (0.00) (0.003) (0.003) (0.004) (0.003) (0.004) (0.004) 
Rapporteur 0.12** 0.22** 0.70* 0.13** -0.03 0.25** 0.24** 0.14 0.43*** 
13.1% 24.8% 100.6% 14.2% -3.2% 28.9% 26.9% 15.6% 54.1% 
(0.059) (0.093) (0.381) (0.064) (0.113) (0.103) (0.106) (0.135) (0.134) 
Parliament: compare 6th/5th 0.12 0.12    n/a -0.11 -0.13 -0.13 -0.01 0.24** 0.21 
(0.109) (0.141)    n/a (0.106) (0.125) (0.135) (0.110) (0.120) (0.137) 
Parliament: compare 7th/5th  0.04 -0.01 -0.23* 0.03 -0.19 -0.04 -0.3 0.28** 0.11 
[Note: Women org: compare 7th/6th] (0.119) (0.158) (0.131) (0.118) (0.138) (0.146) (0.119) (0.132) (0.153) 
Germany 0.05 -0.20 -0.29 0.04 0.22 0.17 0.21 0.42** -0.08 
(0.141) (0.179) (0.204) (0.136) (0.172) (0.173) (0.144) (0.154) (0.183) 
France 0.09 0.17 0.08 -0.21 0.16 0.12* -0.19 0.06 0.07 
(0.165) (0.212) (0.230) (0.154) (0.186) (0.207) (0.165) (0.179) 0.201 
Italy 0.3** 0.24 0.55** 0.57*** 0.14 0.52** 0.38** 0.32** 0.77*** 
(0.146) (0.19) (0.201) (0.142) (0.165) (0.180) 0.143) (0.162) (0.183) 
United Kingdom 0.50*** 0.58** 0.24 0.42** 0.50*** 0.34** 0.47*** 0.53*** 0.63*** 
(0.141) (0.188) (0.216) (0.137) (0.158) (0.170) (0.139) (0.154) (0.175) 
Number of Observations 560 471 358 578 543 583 552 572 577 
Test for overdispersion: 
   
2  
=  5120.02*** 2909.34*** 2207.42*** 4417.28*** 3611.19*** 3712.2*** 4735.49*** 4470.08*** 3811.82*** 
Vuong Statistic (Zero inflated) z = 1.07 z =  1.08 z = 0.82 z = 1.23 z = 2.38** z =  2.35 z = 1.53* z = 1.56 z = 2.02 
Notes: ***significant at 0.01 level, **significant at 0.05 level, *significant at 0.1 level. Standard errors in parentheses. 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
Table 2   Predicted Counts with Confidence Intervals for
MEPs from the EPP & PES across Interest Group Categories 
Independent Variable Predicted 
Contacts
Confidence 
Intervals 95%
Environmental Groups: 
EPP member 12.99 9.38,   16.61
PES member 9.58 6.72,   12.43
Human Rights Groups:
EPP member 5.4 3.77,   7.05
PES member 3.62 2.33,   4.9
Women's Organisations:
EPP member 5.58 3.40,   7.75
PES member 5.7 3.16,   8.23
Consumer Groups:
EPP member 13.39 9.82,   16.96
PES member 10.08 7.07,   13.09
Agriculture & Fisheries Groups:
EPP member 7.6 5.18,   10.00
PES member 6.38 3.92,   8.85
Banking & Insurance Groups: 
EPP member 6.52 4.40,   8.64
PES member 7.28 4.50,   10.06
Industrial Organisations:
EPP member 15.04 11.11,   18.97
PES member 14.93 10.29,   19.57
Trade & Commerce Associations:
EPP member 15.01 10.63,   19.38
PES member 11.92 7.96,   15.87
Transport Groups:
EPP member 5.9 3.89,   7.90
PES member 6.22 3.69,   8.76
Table 3 Lobbying the EPP & PES
Answers 
received
EPP PES Difference
Civil Society Interest Groups (NGOs) 30 46% 54% (-15%)
Businesses / Business Associations   50 57% 43% (-25%)
Total 80 100% 100% 20%
 
 
 
 
Table 4  Models 2 & 3: 
Explaining Interest Group Contacts with Party Groups that are Not Natural Allies
Independent Variables Environ 
Groups 
Human 
rights 
Groups 
Women's 
Organis- 
ations
Consumer 
Groups
Agriculture 
Fisheries 
Groups
Banking & 
Insurance 
Groups
Industrial 
Organis- 
ations
Trade & 
Commerce 
Associations
Transport 
Groups 
  Model 2 Model 3
   EPP Lobbying by  Civil Societal Interests                PES Lobbying by Producer Interests
Specification Zero Inflated 
NBREG NBREG NBREG NBREG
Zero Inflated 
NBREG  NBREG NBREG NBREG NBREG
Left/Right Self-Placement -0.23*** -0.41*** -0.29*** -0.21*** 0.17* 0.52*** 0.47*** 0.29*** 0.17*
-20.8% -33.9% -24.8% -19.3% 18.1% 67.5% 59.5% 33.6% 18.2%
(0.072) (0.077) (0.940) (0.071) (0.081) (0.115) (0.086) (0.103) (0.085)
Policy Opinion -0.32*** -0.35*** -0.37***     n/a -0.31***     n/a -0.46***     n/a     n/a
-27.5% -29.8% -30.7%     n/a -26.8     n/a -37%     n/a     n/a
(0.087) (0.083) (0.097)     n/a (0.106)     n/a (0.124)     n/a     n/a
Committee membership 1.00*** 0.90*** 2.08*** 0.73** 1.47*** 1.33*** 1.07*** 1.29*** 1.23**
171.9% 145.5% 702.9% 108.4% 336.70% 279.1% 191.2% 261.80% 242.7%
(0.374) (0.252) (0.356) (0.352) (0.318) (0.510) (0.249) (0.459) (0.433)
Participation 0.01* 0.01* -0.01 0.02** 0.01** 0.02*** 0.00 0.01 0.00
1% 1.3% -0.6 1.6% 1.3% 1.8% 0.2% 0.6% 0.2%
(0.006) (0.007) (0.009) (0.006) (0.006) (0.007) (0.005) (0.007) (0.007)
Rapporteur 0.12 0.42** 0.30 0.10* -0.13 0.22* 0.11 0.10 0.65**
12.4% 51.9% 34.8% 11% -12.2% 24.3% 12.1% 10.2% 92.3%
(0.099) (0.165) (0.171) (0.050) (0.135) (0.121) (0.125) (0.186) (0.303)
Parliament: compare 6th/5th 0.44** 0.61***     n/a -0.07 0.31 -0.27 -0.03 0.47** 0.07
(0.188) (0.218)     n/a (0.185) (0.268) (0.235) (0.195) (0.235) (0.262)
Parliament: compare 7th/5th 0.27 0.30 0.51** 0.16 0.16 -0.24 -0.01 0.29 0.33
[Note: Women org: compare 7th/6th] (0.209) (0.257) (0.218) (0.209) (0.271) (0.248) (0.209) (0.244) (0.292)
Germany -0.04 -0.09 -0.72** -0.02 0.42 0.14 0.26 1.01*** -0.33
(0.204) (0.243) (0.307) (0.204) (0.396) (0.305) (0.277) (0.312) (0.375)
France 0.21 0.28 0.22 0.44 0.40 -0.03 -0.17 0.57** 0.24
(0.333) (0.373) (0.424) (0.332) (0.298) (0.314) (0.248) (0.290) (0.341)
Italy 0.02 0.23 0.54* 0.72*** 0.67** 0.57 -0.12 0.66** 0.27
(0.226) (0.254) (0.303) (0.230) (0.359) (0.349) (0.291) (0.336) (0.383)
United Kingdom 0.81*** 1.27*** 1.06** 0.61** 0.75** 0.16 0.63** 0.93*** 0.64*
(0.268) (0.314) (0.467) (0.265) (0.325) (0.318) (0.253) (0.303) (0.354)
Number of Observations 194 173 116 198 160 171 164 167 170
Test for overdispersion: 2 = 1518.65*** 480.69*** 416.44*** 1655.3*** 1000.27*** 969.75*** 946.66*** 959.73*** 1157.47***
Vuong Statistic (Zero inflated) z = 1.94** z =  0.78 z = 0.91 z = 0.85 z =  1.64* z =  0.97 z = 1.28 z = 1.02 z = 0.87
Notes: ***significant at 0.01 level, **significant at 0.05 level, *significant at 0.1 level. Standard errors in parentheses.
